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## **Afghanistan Situation Report**

25X1

2 November 1982

Top Secret


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4	This year's	campaigns	have seriousl	y damaged loca	l crops and villa	ges. 25X1
	INSURGENT ATTACKS SH	UT DOWN P	OL PIPELINE .	• • • • • • •	1	
	Continuing in resistance gr Soviet air an	eatly th	is winter by	the pipeline oreducing critic	closed would help cal fuel supplies	the for 25X1
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	INSURGENT DEFECTIONS	• • • •			2	· .
	Several bands to the govern		longing to Gull	ouddin's organiz	zationhave gone	over 25X1
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	HARD WINTER AHEAD FOR PANJSHERIS 25X1
	this 25X1
J	year's Soviet/Afghan campaigns in the Panjsher Valley seriously damaged local crops and villages. The 80,000 inhabitants, many of whom are now
25 <b>X</b> 1	returning from the mountains, are being forced to buy scarce food at
ZŽVI	inflated prices or rely on outside supplies
	was already as bad as it was last winter and local people will face even
	more serious problems this winter. The Soviet seizure last August of the Koranomunjan area, at the north end of the Valley, cut off a vital supply
	route. The Panjsheris must now rely on a longer Hezbi-Islami-controlled route to the south, which Masood's caravans must pay to use.
	25X1
	Comment: The Soviet seizure of a key supply route may be the first
	move in an effort to cut off insurgent supplies and let the winter do
	what Soviet arms cannot. Because they cannot occupy all areas or depend on their Afghan allies to secure them, the Soviets may try to destroy the
	food supply and to eliminate civilian support in other resistance strong-holds this winter to weaken insurgent groups. The destruction in the
•	Panjsher could become even more valuable to the Soviets if word of star-
	vation there spreads and causes civilians in other areas to withdraw their support of the resistance lest they suffer the same fate.
•	25X1
	INSURGENT ATTACKS SHUT DOWN POL PIPELINE 25X1
	INDERCEMIT INTERIOR SHOT ZONIC TOE TITELINE
	Soviet engineers at Bagram had given up25X1
	hope of operating the new POL pipeline, which was recently extended from Pol-e Khomri and has been the target of frequent guerrilla attacks.
<sup>©</sup> 25X1	Soviet advisers concluded that unidentified "major changes" would be
. 3	needed to protect the pipeline.
25X1	the highway leading north from
	Kabul is considered to be 75 percent under government control. The road segment in question is 65 kilometers long and is guarded by small Soviet
ı	and Afghan units stationed every two kilometers. 25X1
	25X1

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	keep the pipeline closed by reducing critical fuel				Comment	
			ir and groun			
	truck tankers, which are	in rely on	uld have to	Soviets wo	line, the	
	o Kabul. The claim of 75 and would still leave the		ambush on the			
	a highway where the guer-	ters along	of many ki	in control	insurgents	
		voy ambush.	the art of	e perfected	rillas hav	
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				ONS	ENT DEFECTI	TNSURG
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2	nsurgents belonging to the	17 ir	amdamad da T	Tolomi ayımı	Hanalant - i	
	on 29 August. Forty other bands were converted into		endered in r d on 1 Sept			
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	village defense groups in early October, several hundred of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's followers near the	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Panjsher Valley transferred their allegiance to the Jamiat-i-Islami.  Around 20 October, two of Gulbuddin's	25X1
•	bands in Baghlan Province defected to the government. The leaders were made district chiefs, and the men were inducted into the Army and other	23/1
ù	security organizations. Three of Gulbuddin's bands in northern Afghani-	
	stan have also gone over to the government,  Many Army officers suspect these groups surrendered in an effort to	25 <b>X</b> 1
	infiltrate the defense forces.	25X1 25X1
		20/(1
	Comment: Some of these defections may well be fraudulent. In late	
	September, two of Gulbuddin's bands in Nangarhar Province offered to sur-	
	render, but ambushed the force sent to bring them in. Moreover, even if the bands now support the government, those that remain responsible for	
	the defense of their villages could easily turn against the government if	
	it tries to interfere in local affairs. We have, however, never before seen so many reports of defections in a short period of time, presumably	
	an indication that a growing if still smallnumber of insurgents are	
	thinking seriously about making a deal with the government. Followers of Gulbuddin, whose policies have resulted in many clashes among insurgents,	•
	appear to be the most disillusioned. Defections so far have not had a noticeable effect on the level of fighting, but for several years the	
	Soviets have been counting on insurgent war weariness and disillusion	
-	eventually to end the war.	25X1
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	Two non-American employees of the US Embassy in Kabul have been questioned separately by the Soviet-controlled Afghan political police, KHAD, about the embassy's internal security procedures and communications arrangements. As a result, the embassy is heightening its vigilance.
	Wounded Soviet soldiers get priority over wounded Afghan soldiers in treatment and in receiving blood transfusions at hospitals in Kabul,  Afghans sometimes died while waiting for less-seriously wounded Soviets to be treated.
	Libya has dissuaded Al-Zulfikar leaders from moving their headquarters from Kabul to Damascus and is training members of the Pakistani terrorist group, presumably in terrorist tactics. We believe Libyans have trained Al-Zulfikar members in the past.
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